PLO Political Experience From The Armed Resistance to the Peaceful Settlement (1964-2006)

Discussion Committee: 
Dr. Othman Othman
Hamzeh Abdul Hameed Mahmoud Al-Smadi
The thesis examines the nature of the political and intellectual changes in the PLO Coordinates since its inception in 1964 up to the year 2006. The intended amendments to the Palestinian national project, which defined features national charter in 1968. In response to the subjective and objective conditions, the result of the shift, first armed struggle and the People's Liberation War as a way of the full liberalization, to direct negotiations with Israel as a way for a political settlement. Secondly, the shift from the goal of establishing a democratic state on all Palestinian territories, to built National Authority on the part of Palestine, and then to accepting an independent state on the borders of the partition resolution No. 181. and then accepting a transitional self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as a prelude to the establishment of an independent state within the borders of the occupied territories since 1967. And thirdly shift from the goal of the return of refugees to their homes and lands which abandoned them in 1948, to a settlement acceptable and agreed with Israel for their cause. And fourthly the PLO transition from refusal to recognize Israel state, to Palestinian official recognition of its existence in Palestine. Then the shift from refused to recognize the Security Council resolution 242, to an explicit recognition, by Yasser Arafat himself, as a PLO leader. All these transformations and other affected directly on the political and ideological program of the PLO, and its relationship profit regional and international levels. That is known as a cause of division in the Palestinian arena. Section of the Palestinian political forces viewed what was a concession and deviation from the fundamental principles governing the conflict with Israel. The other part consider those shifts as a political realistic program succeed in penetrating the logic of Zionist expansion, and exclusively the western support to Israel at the international scene. Apart from that success is a victory on the Arab disability, and on a limited ability of the Palestinian resistance to win the militarily battle with Israel. Regardless of the arguments of both groups, the best way to absorb this complex political reality and its repercussions, the return to the audit experience the Palestine Liberation Organization from its inception, the reading of the political and the Arab and Palestinian situation that accompanied its inception in 1964. The Researcher notice the role of Egypt led by the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the League of Arab States in crystallizing the idea of the Palestinian entity and the PLO establishment 1964, and the drafting of its charter to national statute. Arab role retreated somewhat after the defeat of Arab armies in the war in June 1967, and the increasing role of the resistance in return, especially after the defeat of the Israeli army in the battle of AL-Karameh in 1968, by the Fatah fighters and the Palestinian resistance factions and the Jordanian army. That opened the way for the accession of the Fatah Movement and factions of the Palestinian armed action to the Organization(PLO)in 1969,and thus led to the dominance of Fateh on the political resolution of the PLO, following the election of Yasser Arafat representative of the Fateh as PLO Executive Committee President in that year. At the same time, Fateh has changed the National Charter of the PLO, and amended some of its clauses and articles, Which became the National Charter. Since then, it can be said that there has been an overlap between the principles of Fateh, and the PLO objectives and policies. In the next chapter researcher moved on to talk about the determinants of the PLO political decision-making, and internal and external considerations to be taken into account in its decision, and the mechanisms used in its drafting, and the nature of political parties participating in it, and specialized institutions in the industry, and output. the researcher concluded that the Palestinian decision tends to rely on the tactic more than commitment to strategy, And Dominated by the personal nature of the charismatic Yasser Arafat than by the opinion of the collective leadership of the PLO. The researcher pointed out that the main output of this situation was the Composition of the (Front rejection) led by George Habash the PFLP former Secretary-General, and the absence of any real impact for many years by the national forces and the masses of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. That was why the writer on the third chapter tries to answer the question which is about the meaning of political legitimacy. Including the monitoring of the source of the legitimacy and its mechanisms, In the Palestinian arena, the Arab world, and internationally. It is a very important issue, because the hostile force has spared no effort in trying to create political alternatives to the PLO throughout many years. The researcher says here, that the leadership of the organization has succeeded in blending the revolutionary legitimacy and legality charisma, In addition to the use of historical legitimacy, to devote political legitimacy. Despite the provision of the organization's leadership political concessions mission to the United States of America in 1988, and to Israel in 1993, the price of recognizing the legitimacy of representation of the Palestinian people in return. In Chapter Four, Because of these concessions the Researcher analyzed the PLO position draft political settlement of international and regional raised since 1967, and even the start of the Madrid peace conference in 1991. He Address some detail on the Palestinian national project, founded, principles, and objectives. Researcher addressed how the transformation of this project to a phased program 1974, and then to the political agenda in 1979, and to the peace initiative in 1988, and to the 1993 Oslo Accords. He said: there are several circumstances and events have contributed to these transformations, and affected on the components of the project and the national cohesion. For example, the civil war in Jordan in 1970, and the war with Israel in 1973, and the civil war in Lebanon in 1975, and the Palestinian Israeli war in 1982 and the siege of Israel to the PLO forces in Beirut for 87 days, then the outbreak of the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987. In Chapter five Researcher was dealing with the stages of the political negotiations between the PLO and the government of Israel since 1991, and its consequences, and their negative impact on the entire Palestinian situation. And how the organization's leadership absorbed the political changes that preceded these negotiations, and the purpose of participating, although no readiness to settle by the Israeli leadership, as demonstrated by the official Israeli policy towards the Palestinians. In Chapter six the writer noticed the presence of five main reasons stood behind the political and intellectual changes in the PLO national draft since 1968 until 1993, as a Conclusion to his Thesis. the first one concern to the political weakness of the PLO, In addition to the structural imbalance in its internal affairs. Resulted in multiple factions and ideas and slogans which led to the organizational divisions, and the absence of the role of the institution and the individual dominance of the resolution, and attempts to create alternatives and the marginalization of the role of the West Bank and Gaza Strip national movement. Secondly, military weakness resulted from the weakness of the military unity of the resistance factions, and the absence of the Safe Base, and fighting the Israelis' from outside the borders of Palestine, and repeated defeats in the field of internal Jordanian and Lebanese fronts, in addition to the defeats in the confrontation with Israel. Thirdly, the internationalization of the Palestinian cause, and the strong connection between the future of the Great States interests like the U.S.A and Russia and the Western European countries with any solution to the Palestinian cause. Fourthly, the Arab regimes Wobblers attitude towards the Palestinian resistance, programmers and objectives, and also how to resolve the conflict with Israel. Finally, the emergence of political and intellectual currents within the PLO itself, calls for political realism, and political tactics, and to search for a peaceful settlement with Israel, and not neglecting the powers that govern the conflict with Israel. Ultimately, the Researcher said that the Palestinian leadership has resorted to political experimentation approach to achieving the PLO objectives, and adopted a policy of crisis management rather than treatment. that weaken their ability to accomplish national project. At last the Researcher made a number of recommendations, such as: 1- Rebuild PLO on democracy and constitutionality basics. 2- Review its political program after all the political developments in the Palestinian cause. 3- Fighting any manifestations of corruption, and strengthen its institutions and strengthening the national unity as away to enhance its legitimacy. 4- Dealing with the negotiations with Israel as a form of political struggle to achieve national goals.
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